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The Unbearable Lightness* of
Consent in Contract Law
Chunlin Leonhard †
Abstract
The consent concept has enjoyed a dominant position in contract
law. Scholars have described it as “the master concept that defines
the law of contracts in the United States.” 1 That makes intuitive
sense. Contracts are private agreements—a set of terms and
conditions to which the parties have consented. Some have pointed
out that the consent doctrine helps promote individual autonomy and
freedom of contract, core values protected by contract law. Consent
has served to legitimize and justify the government’s choice of sides in
a contractual relationship.
This Article queries whether consent alone is sufficient to justify
the government’s choice of sides in a private contractual relationship.
This Article contributes to the current scholarly discussion on the
problematic aspects of consent and proposes an alternative way to
evaluate when a court should use its coercive power to enforce a
contract. This Article proposes that contract law abandon its consentcentric focus. The elasticity of the concept and its easy manipulability
render it an improper basis for state intervention. Instead, courts
should adopt a totality of circumstances standard to determine
whether government should exercise its coercive power to favor one
contractual party over the other.
*

I thank Professor Steve Ramirez of Loyola University Chicago School of
Law for the title inspired by Milan Kundera’s book, The Unbearable
Lightness of Being. Milan Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of
Being (Michael Henry Heim trans., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
20th anniversary ed. 2004) (1984). In that book, Kundera explored the
concept of “lightness.” He described the insignificance of life as “light.”
As discussed in this Article, the consent concept, despite the ideal
imbued in it and the beauty of its appeal, is ultimately too “light” as
the justification for the government’s choice of sides in a private
contractual relationship.
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Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 Yale L.J. 899, 900
(1994).
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Introduction
“We use consent theory not as a map, not realizing that like
any other map it’s simpler than reality, but as a set of blinders
or rose-colored glasses that make the world look clearer, less
problematic, than it really is.” 2

The consent concept 3 has enjoyed a dominant position in contract
law. 4 Scholars have described it as “the master concept that defines
2.

Don Herzog, Happy Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory 247
(1989).

3.

Many scholarly discussions of consent seem to conflate consent as an act
with consent as the central concept of a consent theory. The consent
theory portrays society as consisting of free, independent individuals who
control their own destiny and who are free to make their own choices. Id.
at 1. It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore the relationship between consent as an act and its role as a central concept of consent
theory. This Article focuses on consent as used in contract law. The
consent concept has been used or relied upon in different areas of law. It
has contributed to the discussion of the reasonableness of police searches.
See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206–08 (2002) (determining that a police search was reasonable when conducted after the
officers had approached the defendants on a bus and the defendants had
consented); see also Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary”, but Still Reasonable:
A New Paradigm for Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80
Ind. L.J. 773 (2005) (discussing the consent doctrine in the context of
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the law of contracts in the United States.” 5 That makes intuitive
sense. Contracts are private agreements—a set of terms and conditions to which the parties have consented. 6 Some have pointed out
that the consent doctrine helps promote individual autonomy and
freedom of contract, core values to which contract law is committed. 7
After all, individual autonomy and freedom would not mean much if an
individual’s consent did not matter. Consent has morally justified and
legitimized government intervention in private contractual relationships. 8
This Article does not question the role of consent as the basis for

warrantless police searches). It has relieved some forms of criminal
liability, for example through the consent defense in rape cases. See, e.g.,
People v. Khan, 264 N.W.2d 360, 366 n.5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978)
(“Although the [Michigan rape] statute is silent on the defense of consent,
. . . it impliedly comprehends that a willing, noncoerced act of sexual
intimacy or intercourse between persons of sufficient age . . . is not
criminal sexual conduct.”). It has shielded some from civil liability, and
imposed civil liability on some others. See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Graduated
Consent in Contract and Tort Law: Toward a Theory of Justification, 61
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 17, 19–20, 23 (2010) (discussing the consent
defense to medical malpractice liability, as embedded in the tort law defense of assumption of risk, and consent as the basis for contract liability).
4.

See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 Colum. L.
Rev. 269, 270 (1986) (proposing that “[a] consent theory of contract
explains why we generally take an ‘objective’ approach to contractual
intent and why we deviate from this approach in some situations” and
that “[c]onsent is the moral component that distinguishes valid from
invalid transfers of alienable rights”); see also Menachem Mautner,
Contract, Culture, Compulsion, or: What is so Problematic in the
Application of Objective Standards in Contract Law? 3 Theoretical
Inquiries L. 545, 551 (2002) (indicating that an objective “reasonable
person” approach to contracts “evolved into one of the most entrenched
dogmas of contract law”).

5.

Schuck, supra note 1, at 900; see also Bell, supra note 3, at 36
(providing examples indicating the importance of consent to contract
law).

6.

See Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine,
94 Yale L.J. 997, 1010 (1985) (discussing the notion that contracts are
“private” and controlled by the parties).

7.

See Michael J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract
8–9 (1993) (examining the political justification for “private ordering”);
Peter A. Alces, Contract Reconceived, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 39, 42 (2001)
(explaining that consent is “vindicated by . . . individual autonomy”);
Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in
the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99
Harv. L. Rev. 384, 384 (1985) (discussing commitment to individual
autonomy).

8.

Barnett, supra note 4, at 304–05.
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a moral obligation to keep one’s promise. 9 It queries whether the
government should primarily rely on consent to justify its decision to
side with one private party over another. Contract law’s consent focus
is increasingly problematic due to multiple factors. To begin with,
consent is an amorphous, difficult-to-define concept that is made increasingly more difficult by the marketplace manipulations of human
decision making biases. 10 Is it consent simply because someone signed
an agreement? Is it consent if a person signed an agreement without
having all the information or without understanding the available
information? Is it consent if someone signed an agreement, but
unbeknownst to her, the agreement was carefully designed to induce
her to sign the agreement? 11
With the advent of the “age of persuasion,” 12 defining consent and
ascertaining its existence have become even more difficult, if not
9.

This Article also does not participate in a debate about the importance
or necessity of consent to legitimate government. For an interesting
discussion on this topic see Ilya Somin, Revitalizing Consent, 23 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 753 (2000). This Article merely questions contract
law’s reliance on consent as a justification for contract enforcement.

10.

See Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding
Commitment, 75 Ind. L.J. 1125, 1125 (2000) (pointing out that consent
is a “fuzzy and contested” concept). One could argue that the problem
with consent is not a matter of definition, but rather an issue about
what standard to use to ascertain its existence. The meaning of consent
is practically limited by the standards used to ascertain its existence.
For example, if one adopts the objective standard to ascertain whether a
party has consented by looking at the outward manifestation of consent,
the consent as ascertained would mean apparent consent without regard
to whether truly voluntary consent existed. On the other hand, if one
defines consent as voluntarily arising out of one’s free will, the objective
standard is not up to the task of ascertaining the existence of consent as
defined. This Article treats the problem related to consent both as an
issue of definition and standard. Part of the problem with the concept is
defining how voluntary consent must be in order to qualify as consent
that pays tribute to the core values of contract law—individual
autonomy and freedom of contract. See Trebilcock, supra note 7, at
127 (“From an autonomy perspective, where choices are made on the
basis of critically defective information, at some point such choices
presumably cease to satisfy the conditions for an autonomous choice.”).

11.

See, e.g., Silver v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d
1330, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (examining a situation where a plaintiff
alleged that a lender “engaged in ‘bait and switch’ tactics whereby [the
lender] induced her into applying for a mortgage with promises of low
interest rates, low monthly payments and a fixed interest rate, but then
changed the terms of the mortgage at closing”).

12.

I borrowed the phrase from the title of a book written by Terry O’Reilly
and Mike Tennant. Terry O’Reilly & Mike Tennant, The Age of
Persuasion (2009). O’Reilly and Tennant also created “The Age of
Persuasion” radio show, broadcast by the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation and Sirius Radio.
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impossible. Behavioral studies during the last few decades have
provided a more in-depth understanding of human decision-making
processes, including predictable biases. 13 Relying on those insights,
powerful commercial forces have deliberately manipulated people’s
decisions. 14 Those unprecedented marketplace phenomena have raised
some thorny issues for contract law. These days, voluntary consent
may not exist even when all of the traditional indicia of consent exist.
People could have signed an agreement and intended to enter into
certain transactions and yet there might not be actual “consent.” An
outward manifestation of consent does not necessarily equal the
knowledge required for meaningful consent.
An example of such marketplace manipulation is the subprime
mortgage transactions that caused the current financial crisis. Studies
showed that lenders deliberately designed mortgage products so that
they appeared more affordable to borrowers than they actually were. 15
When the borrowers signed the mortgage agreements, does their
“consent” justify the government’s choice to side with the lenders?
Courts have generally answered the question affirmatively in the
litigation arising out of subprime mortgage crisis. 16
13.

See Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow 8–10 (2011)
(tracing the studies that Kahneman and his colleagues conducted since
the 1970s that eventually uncovered many human decision biases that
undermine the generally accepted notion that human beings are rational).

14.

A Federal Trade Commission study found that fourty-four reporting
companies in 2006 spent a total of $9.6 billion to market food and
beverages. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Marketing Food to Children
and Adolescents: A Review of Industry Expenditures,
Activities, and Self-Regulation ES-2 (2008), available at
http://ftc.gov/os/2008/07/P064504foodmktingreport.pdf. When a person reaches for a can of Coke, how much of that decision is made by the
person? How much of that decision is attributed to the unrelenting TV
commercials promoting Coke products the person has seen? See Oren
Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage
Contracts, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1073, 1079–80 (2009) (arguing that the
subprime mortgage crisis was caused by lenders pushing “risky credit
onto borrowers who were incapable of repaying” because the borrowers
had “imperfect rationality”); Alan M. White, Behavior and Contract, 27
L. & Inequality 135, 158–160 (2009) (pointing out that the marketing
industry spend billions of dollars on behavioral research to devise
marketing strategies which can increase sales).

15.

See, e.g., Bar-Gill, supra note 14, at 1080 (“[L]enders willingly catered
to borrowers’ imperfectly rational demand even when the demanded
product designs increased the default risk borne by lenders.”).

16.

See, e.g., Silver, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 1334 (granting defendants’ summary
judgment motion on all of plaintiff borrower’s claims including
contractual claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing); see also Caraang v. PNC
Mortg., 795 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (D. Haw. 2011) (dismissing plaintiff
borrowers’ claim for breach of the duty of good faith because a party
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Because of the ease with which “consent” can be manipulated,
contract law’s consent focus will inevitably lead the courts to use the
coercive power of the state to favor the more powerful party in an economic relationship. 17 The party with more bargaining power, resources,
and better access to information is in a better position to manipulate.
Some scholars have identified the problems with contract law’s
commitment to consent. 18 Some have identified defects related to
consent in the area of standard form contracts 19 and cyberspace
contracts. 20 Professor Radin, in her article Humans, Computers and
cannot breach a covenant of good faith and fair dealing before a
contract is formed); Finuliar v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P, No.
C-11-02629 JCS, 2011 WL 4405659 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2011) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing because plaintiff failed to identify a specific contractual
provision as a basis for the claim); Perez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
No. C-11-02279 JCS, 2011 WL 3809808 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2011) (dismissing the borrowers’ contract claims because the plaintiffs failed to
identify any specific contractual provisions that were breached or
frustrated); Heaton v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 10-12394, 2011 WL
3112325 (E.D. Mich. July 26, 2011) (dismissing plaintiff claim because
the plaintiff alleged nothing more than an ordinary business relationship
between the plaintiff and defendant); Park v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB,
No. 10CV1547-WQH-RBB, 2011 WL 98408 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2011)
(dismissing all of the plaintiff borrowers’ claims including claims for
breach of good faith and fair dealing and unconscionability because the
complaint failed to sufficiently allege terms of contract to which the
covenant could attach). It is not hard to imagine that some borrowers
did not even assert any contractual claims, probably recognizing the
futility of attempting such a claim under contract law.
17.

“Enforcement, in fact, puts the machinery of the law in the service of
one party against the other. When that is worthwhile and how that
should be done are important questions of public policy.” Morris R.
Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 562 (1933).

18.

See, e.g., Trebilcock, supra note 7, at 126 (pointing out that “it is
difficult, if not impossible, to resolve most problems of information
asymmetry within the framework of an internal theory of contract
premised on consensually assumed obligations”); see also Peter A. Alces,
Guerrilla Terms, 56 Emory L.J. 1511, 1514 (2007) (discussing issues
raised by the reality of standard form contracts and finding it
“appropriate to question the role and operation of doctrine that has
strayed too far from the substantial, real bargain and agreement, to the
insubstantial, indeed aleatory, inference of consent”); Radin, supra note
10, at 1125–28 (questioning contract law’s commitment to consent in the
face of commercial computer-contracting practices); West, supra note 7,
at 428 (arguing that “consent itself” does not best promote autonomy).

19.

See, e.g., Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for
Using “Knowing Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for
Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 31 Seattle U. L. Rev. 469, 500–
02 (2008) (discussing how the “rolling contract theory” is defective when
weighed against more modern approaches to contract theory).

20.

Radin, supra note 10, at 1128–29.
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Binding Commitments, raised some thoughtful questions about the
consent-based approach. 21 She examined commercial practices in
online computer contracting and queried whether “the move online
exacerbate[s] the disjuncture between the consent-based picture and
the reality of transactions.” 22
So far, contract law has addressed the defects related to consent
through a patchwork of contract defenses and doctrines such as
unconscionability. 23 Courts’ analyses of contract law issues have
generally not deviated from the consent-centric approach. 24 Continued
reliance on consent will lead to a deeper disconnect between contract
law and marketplace realities. 25 This Article suggests an alternative
approach that attempts to untether the contract law analysis from the
traditional consent focus. 26
To provide a context for the discussion, Part I of this Article draws
on the findings of behavioral studies to explain why our society seems
to be so enthralled by the consent concept. It also attempts to clarify
the meaning of consent. Part II examines contract law doctrines
designed to ascertain the existence of consent and those doctrines’
limitations. Part III of the Article identifies some problems with relying
on the consent doctrine as a lynchpin for enforcement. Finally, Part IV
21.

Id. at 1125.

22.

Id. at 1126.

23.

See infra Part III.D.

24.

See cases cited supra note 16.

25.

As this Article is being drafted, the Occupy Wall Street Movement is
spreading throughout different cities in the United States. The
organization’s website describes itself as a “leaderless resistance
movement with people of many colors, genders and political persuasions.
The one thing we all have in common is that We Are The 99% that will
no longer tolerate the greed and corruption of the 1%. We are using the
revolutionary Arab Spring tactic to achieve our ends and encourage the
use of nonviolence to maximize the safety of all participants.” Occupy
Wall Street, http://occupywallst.org (last visited Sept. 22, 2012).

26.

This proposal reflects not a dislike of the consent concept or all the ideals
associated with it, but rather a realization of the difficulty, if not the
impossibility, of determining the existence of consent. The elasticity of the
concept and its easy manipulability renders it an improper basis for state
intervention. This Article does not argue that an individual’s consent should
not matter. Indeed, in an ideal world, if an individual’s consent is a result of
equal bargaining power with equal access to information and full
comprehension and adequate tools exist to ascertain its existence, an
individual’s consent would be adequate to justify government enforcement
of the promise. The problem is that we do not live in an ideal world: the
appearance of consent can be easily manipulated and powerful commercial
forces are manipulating human decision making biases to achieve the
appearance of consent. The consent-focused inquiry distracts courts from
more important considerations of fairness.
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of this Article proposes that courts apply a totality of circumstances
standard to determine on whose behalf the government should exercise
its coercive power in a contractual relationship.

I.

Understanding Consent

Why are we so enthralled by the consent concept? What explains its
iconic status in contract law? What exactly does consent mean? What
kind of consent reflects the core values of individual autonomy and
freedom of contract? This Part offers some thoughts on these questions.
A.

The Appeal of Consent

The consent concept has strong emotional appeal in our society
because we as a society pride ourselves on individual autonomy and
freedom. 27 The concept belongs to the basket of core ideas that
underlie the American Dream. 28 The central idea of the American
Dream is that we are in control of our own destiny. It has been
described as “the creed of the rugged individualist—a belief that
anyone who works hard can succeed. . . . As free agents in a free
society, we would all have equal access to economic opportunity.” 29
The consent concept is thus consonant with the ideal image that
we would like to have. 30 It gives us a comforting narrative about
ourselves. Humans have a strong need for coherence. 31 We are free and
27.

See Herzog, supra note 2, at 215 (clarifying that the author is not
arguing that “consent theory has outlived its usefulness” because we are
“still in large part a world of masterless men”); Bell, supra note 3, at 29
(using human autonomy to argue that “aretaic moral philosophies
should value consent as a necessary constituent of human flourishing”).

28.

See Rick Steves, A United Europe in the 21st Century: Eclipsing the
American Dream?, Rick Steves’ Eur., http://www.ricksteves.com/
about/pressroom/activism/eurodream.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2012)
(claiming that“[t]he American Dream emphasizes autonomy, national
pride, and material wealth”). Pop literature also promotes the message
that the individual alone is responsible for his or her own fate. See
Barbara Ehrenreich, Bait and Switch 81 (2005) (quoting from a
“pop-psych fad” book and indicating that “[i]t’s a long-standing American
idea . . . that circumstances count for nothing compared to the power of
the individual will”).

29.

Steves, supra note 28.

30.

Upon this concept was born an entire consent theory. Don Herzog
described this “familiar figure” that “haunts modern society” as “the
free agent, bound only by his own choices. He chooses a career, a
spouse, a religion, a lifestyle, and more. He animates our moral and
political arguments, our very idea of what a person is, and our social
lives.” Herzog, supra note 2, at ix.

31.

Nobel Prize–winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman wrote extensively
about the human need for coherence in his recent book, Thinking, Fast
and Slow. Kahneman, supra note 13, at 79–88.
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independent and we control our own destiny. 32 We are free to agree or
not to agree, to consent or not to consent because we alone can define
our relationships with others. 33 Respect for consent means respect for
our individualism and autonomy. 34
Contract law naturally embraces the consent concept as the
lynchpin for enforcement of promises. This is an easy story to tell
and sell. 35 Indeed, one could argue that the danger of the consent
concept (and its ability to do mischief) lies in its strong appeal and
coherence. Because of its appeal, there is no ready constituent to
expose its potential to do mischief. There is little political will to
save people from themselves.
The alternative narrative, which unfortunately more closely
resembles reality, is a more difficult story, as behavioral economists
have shown. 36 We are not really free. 37 We have multiple obligations
to family, friends, superiors, and various affiliated groups. 38 Our

32.

See Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experimentation and the Ethics of Autonomy, 36 Cath. Law. 455, 461 (1996)
(“Both the legitimating and justifying faces of consent purportedly
embody and advance notions of freedom and autonomy.”). Some have
pointed out that the concept of consent and the related concept of
individualism have contributed to the success of this country. It
motivated people to do their best because of a strong belief in
themselves. Steves, supra note 28. While the consent concept can do
good, we need to be mindful of its ability to do harm when used as a
basis for government intervention.

33.

Schuck, supra note 1, at 900–01.

34.

Garnett, supra note 32, at 489.

35.

This message is repeated in many popular literature and self-help books.
E.g., Ehrenreich, supra note 28, at 81–82. The consent concept is also
consistent with America’s historical distrust of government and provides
a ready justification for keeping the government out of people’s private
economic relationships. See Daniel B. Klein, 3 Libertarian Essays
30 (1998) (“Where people distrust government, they choose politically to
have much liberty . . . .”).

36.

See Kahneman, supra note 13, at 128 (pointing out that human
decision-making biases, such as priming effect, “threaten the subjective
sense of agency and autonomy”).

37.

See Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational 321 (First Harper
Perennial ed. 2010) (“[W]e are pawns in a game whose forces we largely
fail to comprehend. We usually think of ourselves as sitting in the
driver’s seat, with ultimate control over the decisions we make and the
direction our life takes; but, alas, this perception has more to do with
our desires—with how we want to view ourselves—than with reality.”).

38.

See Garnett, supra note 32, at 509 (“We are not simply ‘choosers,’ as
the ethic of autonomy and consent posits. We are members, friends, and
loved ones as well.”).
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choices can be easily swayed. 39 We often make decisions not based on
best evidence and we are distracted by secondary considerations. 40
Our flaws are so predictable that we can be easily manipulated. 41
When we agree to do certain things, it may be due to multiple
reasons that may not reflect our free will. 42 Our decisions may reflect
our environment and other external factors. 43 In reality, we make very
few decisions free of outside influences. 44
Faced with the ideal and the real, we embrace the ideal wholeheartedly. Indeed any challenge to the consent doctrine could risk being
viewed as advocating for irresponsible behavior. How can anyone argue
that someone should not be held accountable for what they have agreed
to do‽ 45 The consent concept is in essence part of our identity.
39.

See Kahneman, supra note 13, at 140 (describing psychologist Paul
Slovic’s work, which shows that human judgment is guided more by
emotions than reasons and is easily influenced by multiple factors).

40.

See id. at 128 (describing the influence of priming effects, “in which
your thoughts and behavior may be influenced by stimuli to which you
pay no attention at all, and even by stimuli of which you are completely
unaware”). Studies have shown that people do not necessarily act to
maximize their economic interests. See Michael Shermer, The Mind
of the Market 176 (2008) (“[E]xtremely low ultimatum game offers
are usually rejected—we are willing to forgo gain in order to prevent
another from receiving an unjust award. That is, we’ll pay to punish
fair-trade transgressors.”); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach
to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1492 (1998) (“People
will often behave in accordance with fairness considerations even when
it is against their financial self-interest and no one will know.”).

41.

See Ariely, supra note 37, at 317 (“[W]e are all far less rational in our
decision making than standard economic theory assumes. Our irrational
behaviors are neither random nor senseless—they are systematic and
predictable.").

42.

See Kahneman, supra note 13, at 128 (“[O]ur thoughts and our
behavior are influenced, much more than we know or want, by the
environment of the moment”).

43.

For example, Professor West pointed out that the characters portrayed
in Kafka’s world seem to better resemble human reality than the
rational being portrayed in Professor Posner’s world. See West, supra
note 7, at 427 (“Our subjective experiences of the consensual
transactions we enter do not accord with Posner’s external descriptions
of those transactions.”).

44.

See Kahneman, supra note 13, at 119–28 (discussing the anchoring
effect’s influence on choices); id. at 129–35 (discussing studies that show
how people’s decisions are affected by availability bias).

45.

I cannot help but be a little defensive myself. This Article does not argue
that people should not be held accountable. Instead, this Article advocates
for an alternative basis to hold people accountable when the coercive
power of the state is invoked. When people’s “consent” no longer reflects
their free will, something more than “consent” is necessary to justify the
state’s use of coercive power in favor of one party.
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B.

The Meaning of Consent

What does consent mean? Webster’s II New College Dictionary
defines consent when used as a noun as “[v]oluntary allowance of
what is planned or done by another.” 46 The dictionary further defines
“voluntary” as “[a]rising from one’s own free will.” 47
This definition raises some questions. How voluntary does a
person’s decision have to be before that decision counts as consent
within the meaning of an autonomous choice? 48 Is it “voluntary” if
one does not have the necessary information to make the decision? Is
it “voluntary” if one makes a choice without being aware that
someone manipulated the information?
A survey of consent scholarship shows general agreement that
certain prerequisites must exist before consent can reflect autonomous
choices. 49 Scholars have identified what they call “informed consent”
as consent that reflects an individual’s autonomy. 50 Under the
informed consent analysis, in order to give consent, one needs volition
(the power to use one’s will), information, and comprehension. 51
The volition requirement of consent “requires conditions free of
coercion and undue influence.” 52 Coercion occurs when one person
threatens to harm the other person in order to obtain consent. 53
“Undue influence, by contrast, occurs through an offer of an excessive,
unwarranted, inappropriate or improper reward or other overture in
order to obtain compliance.” 54 Additionally, “inducements that would
46.

Webster’s II New College Dictionary 245 (3d ed. 2005).

47.

Id. at 1267.

48.

See Trebilcock, supra note 7, at 127 (“From an autonomy perspective,
where choices are made on the basis of critically defective information,
at some point such choices presumably cease to satisfy the conditions for
an autonomous choice.”).

49.

See, e.g., id. at 102 (emphasizing that “[e]ven the most committed
proponents of free markets and freedom of contract recognize that
certain information preconditions must be met for a given exchange” to
be efficient).

50.

Julia A. Pedroni & Kenneth D. Pimple, A Brief Introduction to
Informed Consent in Research with Human Subjects 4–5 (2001).

51.

Nat’l Comm’n for the Prot. of Human Subjects of Biomedical
& Behavioral Research, The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Research 10–14 (1978) [hereinafter Belmont Report].

52.

Id. at 14.

53.

Id.

54.

Id.; see also Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533, 539
(Ct. App. 1966) (“[A] person’s will may be overborne without
misrepresentation.”).
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ordinarily be acceptable may become undue influences if the subject is
especially vulnerable.” 55
The next requirement of informed consent requires access to
information. 56 Even when one has the will to become informed, one
needs to have the necessary information. If one cannot have physical
access to information, one cannot evaluate all the options. 57 Consent
based on limited information cannot be consent that promotes
individual autonomy and freedom of contract. 58
Furthermore, mere physical possession of information without
comprehension will not result in consent, either. 59 Comprehension is
thus an important requirement for meaningful consent. The ability to
understand depends on intelligence, rationality, maturity, and
language. 60 Comprehension is influenced by internal constraints such
as cognitive ability and decision-making biases and external
constraints such as cultural biases and marketplace manipulations. 61
Let us consider the following consent scenarios against the
backdrop of the informed consent discussion. 62
1. Party B had all the information and understood all the information. Party B carefully weighed all of his options by
considering the costs and benefits of each option. Party B was
in a position to negotiate with Party A. After negotiating with
Party A on several issues, Party B signed the agreement.

55.

Belmont Report, supra note 51, at 14. A California court described
undue influence as “a shorthand legal phrase used to describe persuasion
which tends to be coercive in nature, persuasion which overcomes the
will without convincing the judgment.” Odorizzi, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
As the court later acknowledged, “[t]he difficulty, of course, lies in
determining when the forces of persuasion have overflowed their normal
banks and become oppressive flood waters.” Id. at 541. Product
advertising influences people’s decisions, but it is tolerated, and most
would agree that it does not rise to the level of undue influence.

56.

Belmont Report, supra note 51, at 11–12.

57.

Pedroni & Pimple, supra note 50, at 5–6.

58.

Id. at 6.

59.

Id.

60.

Belmont Report, supra note 51, at 12.

61.

See id. at 13 (explaining that “[s]pecial provision[s]” might need to be
made for those with impaired cognitive abilities such as mental
disability).

62.

This is a crude attempt to categorize certain situations implicating
consent analysis for the sake of articulating the issues raised by contract
law’s focus on consent. Some of the examples are derived from actual
court cases, summarized and abbreviated to highlight the defect with
consent.
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2. Party B had all the information and thought that he understood everything, but unbeknownst to him, Party A had deliberately designed and presented the options to lead Party B to
the option preferred by Party A. Party A’s options were designed to exploit human decision-making biases identified by
behavioral studies. Party B chose the predicted option and
signed the agreement.
3. Party B had all the information and understood the information. However, Party B was not in a position to negotiate
and had no alternatives anyway. Party B signed the agreement.
4. Party B had all the information, but Party B did not understand the information or Party B did not bother to read the
agreement. Nonetheless, Party B signed the agreement.
5. Party A failed to disclose a material fact to Party B. Party B
signed the agreement.
6. Party A misrepresented a material fact. Relying on the misrepresentation, Party B signed the agreement.
7. Party B was confined in a cast in a hospital. Party A spent two
hours persuading Party B to sign an agreement to release claims
for personal injuries in exchange for a relatively small sum. At
the time of signing, Party B was in a highly nervous and
hysterical condition and suffering much pain, and she signed the
release in order to get rid of Party A.
8. Party A told Party B that Party B would be hanged or thrown
into the river if he did not sign the agreement. Party B signed
the agreement.

These scenarios of consent present a spectrum of consent, from
informed consent to increasingly problematic consent. At both extremes
(Scenarios 1 and 8), the answer is easy. At one end of the spectrum
with Scenario 1, we have informed consent where a party gives consent
knowingly—with full information and comprehension. In that situation,
Party B is not coerced. Party B has access to information and
understands all the information. Party B can weigh the costs and
benefits and negotiate with Party A. Scenario 1 agreements embody the
ideal paradigm upon which contract law is based.
At the other end of the spectrum with Scenario 8, there is only
apparent consent obtained as a result of threats of physical harm. All
reasonable people would agree that the transaction involved no
meaningful consent. Enforcing a Scenario 8 agreement would not
advance contract law’s goal of protecting individual autonomy and
freedom of contract. Under contract law, courts have refused to
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enforce that type of agreement. 63 Contract law defenses such as fraud,
duress, and undue influence recognize the defects in consent in
Scenarios 6, 7 and 8. 64
But the decision gets harder in agreements falling between the
two extreme ends. Scenario 2 raises the consent problem with which
this Article is concerned. As discussed below, current contract law’s
consent-centric approach means that most of the contracts between
Scenarios 2 and 5 will be enforced by the courts despite the problems
that speak against the existence of a truly voluntary consent.

II. Consent and Contract Law
This Part examines the ways contract law has relied on consent
to justify its choice to side with one private party over the other. This
Part briefly reviews contract law formation doctrines, defenses, and
interpretation and construction principles and points out that the consent concept is reflected in numerous contract law doctrines. Application of contract law doctrines is essentially a quest for parties’ consent.
A.

Consent and Contract Formation

The consent concept is reflected in contract law doctrines
governing contract formation such as offer, acceptance, mutual assent,
and intent. These concepts are essentially vehicles for courts to
determine whether consent exists. 65 Because courts do not have mindreading ability, courts have to rely on observable evidence to
ascertain whether parties consented. 66 The task is made more difficult

63.

See, e.g., Brown v. Pierce, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 205, 214 (1868) (“[M]oral
compulsion, such as that produced by threats to take life or to inflict
great bodily harm, as well as that produced by imprisonment, is
everywhere regarded as sufficient, in law, to destroy free agency,
without which there can be no contract, because, in that state of the
case, there is no consent.”).

64.

See Lawrence Kalevitch, Gaps in Contracts: A Critique of Consent
Theory, 54 Mont. L. Rev. 169, 193 (1993) (noting that liberalism has
promoted “the idea of limits to freedom of contract and has endorsed
doctrines such as duress and unconscionability that are said typically to
‘police’ the bargain”).

65.

See Barnett, supra note 4, at 304 (“Contract theory searches for the
‘extra’ factor that, if present, justifies the legal enforcement of a
commitment or promise.”). One can question whether the concepts of
offer, acceptance, and assent or intent necessarily equal the concept of
consent. It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine the subtle
differences between these concepts. Suffice it to say that, in most cases,
consent is implicit in those terms, and a search for offer, acceptance, and
assent or intent is really a search for consent.

66.

See id. at 305 (“[We] learn the meaning of terms by comparing (1) the
conduct of persons with their words, or (2) their conduct and words in
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because courts have to ascertain the existence of consent after a
dispute has arisen. When parties are in a dispute, they generally will
have conflicting and self-serving testimony about whether one party
consented. But courts cannot read the consenter’s mind. By necessity,
courts have developed doctrines to assist them in this task.
An examination of those doctrines reveals that courts have primarily
adopted an objective approach to ascertain the existence of consent. 67
Under the objective test, courts look at objective manifestations of
intent—essentially, what a reasonable person looking at the outward
manifestation would have understood the intent to be.68 The professed
reason for the objective test is to protect certainty of contracts and the
other party’s reliance on the promisor’s manifestations. 69
To assess whether a party has consented, courts focus on evidence
such as signature on an agreement, spoken words, or other actions
related to the transaction. Courts have placed heavy emphasis on a
party’s signature. 70 They have held a party accountable for giving an
one context with those in another, or (3) one person’s conduct and
words with another person’s conduct and words.”).
67.

See Mautner, supra note 4, at 551 (“[O]ver the course of the twentieth
century, the objective approach evolved into one of the most entrenched
dogmas of contract law.”); see also Ray v. William G. Eurice & Bros.,
93 A.2d 272, 279 (Md. 1952) (“[W]here there has been an integration of
an agreement, those who executed it will not be allowed to place their
own interpretation on what it means or was intended to mean. The test
in such case is objective and not subjective.”); Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 21 (1981) (rejecting the subjective approach). For an
interesting perspective on the origins of the objective theory, see Joseph
M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation
and Interpretation, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 427, 428 (2000) (stating that
“objective approaches have predominated in the common law of
contracts since time immemorial” and describing “a brief but almost
inconsequential flirtation with subjective approaches in the midnineteenth century”).

68.

Mautner, supra note 4, at 551.

69.

See Perillo, supra note 67, at 442–43 (discussing the desire for certainty
throughout the jurisprudence of the early republic).

70.

See e.g., MCC–Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova
d’Agostino, S.P.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1387 n.9 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[P]arties
who sign contracts will be bound by them regardless of whether they
have read them or understood them.”); Linville v. Ginn Real Estate Co.,
697 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1308–09 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (“A party who signs an
instrument is presumed to know its contents. . . . He cannot avoid his
obligations thereunder by alleging that he did not read the contract, or
that the terms were not explained to him, or that he did not understand
the provisions.” (alteration in original) (quoting Benoay v. E.F. Hutton
& Co., 699 F. Supp. 1523, 1529 (S.D. Fla. 1988))); Reliable Fin. Co. v.
Axon, 336 So. 2d 1271, 1274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (finding “that a
party to a writing cannot deny its contents on the ground that he [or
she] signed it without reading it”).
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impression of assent when a party signed a contract even though the
party might not have read or understood the terms. 71 Courts have
often stated that parties have a duty to read the document before
they sign it. 72 Accordingly, if a party objectively manifests assent to
be bound to a contract (the best example is by signing a contract), a
court will almost automatically find assent to all terms contained in
the writing. Typically, Courts readily dismiss parties’ statements such
as, “I didn’t read it” or “I didn’t understand it,” absent circumstances
which give rise to contract law defenses such as fraud,
unconscionability, or incompetence. 73
The objective test furthers important goals of certainty and
predictability of contract. Scholars and courts have identified the advantages of this approach. 74 It provides certainty of contract so that the
parties can rely on contractual agreements. It encourages individual
responsibility. 75 One better think carefully before one signs because one
will be held responsible for one’s actions. It also eliminates problems of
proof and results in judicial efficiency because the signature is in black
and white. However, because it focuses on outward manifestations, it
could result in consent being found even though the party did not
consent. 76 Because of market manipulation of information, it is
71.

See, e.g., Dixon v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 2d 1325,
1331–32 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (dismissing plaintiff borrower’s claims because
the plaintiff reviewed and signed the loan documents at closing).

72.

See, e.g., Reliable Fin., 336 So. 2d at 1274 (“It is the duty of every
contracting party to learn and know its contents before he signs and
delivers it.” (quoting All Fla. Sur. Co. v. Coker, 88 So. 2d 508, 511 (Fla.
1956))); see also cases cited supra note 70.

73.

See, e.g., Silver v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d
1330, 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (granting summary judgment in favor of the
lender and denying the borrower’s claims of fraud, conspiracy to
defraud, and unfair trade practices because she was deemed to have
knowledge of the document she signed); O.W. Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 464 (1897) (“[T]he making of a contract
depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the
agreement of two sets of external signs,—not on the parties’ having
meant the same thing but on their having said the same thing.”).

74.

See, e.g., Universal Studios, Inc. v. Viacom, Inc., 705 A.2d 579, 589
(Del. Ch. 1997) (“The necessity of preserving predictability and stability
in commercial transactions is fostered by this objective view of
contracts . . . .”); Alces, supra note 18 at 1517–18 (explaining that the
objective test “make[s] questions relating to the formation of contract
and the incidents of contract liability easier to resolve”).

75.

Richard L. Barnes, Rediscovering Subjectivity in Contracts: Adhesion
and Unconscionability, 66 La. L. Rev. 123, 129–30 (2005).

76.

See Mautner, supra note 4, at 562 (arguing that one of four assumptions
implicit in contract interpretation is that the contracting parties share a
“cultural environment” that gives unequivocal meaning to the content of
the contract). Professor Barnett argued that the objective approach is
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increasingly common for there to be a manifestation of consent without
any meaningful consent. 77
Another contract law principle that affects contract law’s consent
analysis is the well-established rule that parties do not owe each other
a duty of good faith prior to the formation of the contract. 78 Contract
law assumes that parties bargain at arms’ length, which means that
parties generally do not have a duty to disclose in the negotiation
process. 79 Without access to information, one party may consent to
the transaction without intending to do so.
B.

Consent and Contract Defenses

Contract law has long recognized some obvious defects with
consent. It has attempted to deal with the defects by allowing certain
defenses. These contract law defenses mark the outer boundaries of
consent enforceable under contract law. Contract law defenses fail,
however, to address the more subtle consent problems identified in
this Article. 80

consistent with the liberty interest that contract law protects because
the objective approach respects and protects “the rights and liberty
interests of others, whose plans and expectations would be severely limited if they were not entitled to rely on things as they appear to be and
to take the assertive conduct of others at face value.” Barnett, supra
note 4, at 306. It is certainly true that the objective approach protects
the reliance interests of the promisee. But the objective approach may be
only paying lip service to the liberty interests of the promisor if it results
in enforcing a promise that the promisor has no intention of making. Even
more concerning is a situation where a promisor is deliberately misled into
agreeing to certain terms because of lack of informed consent due to
information asymmetry and marketplace manipulations. The protection of
the promisee’s reliance interest under an objective theory seems to serve
the interests of certainty and fairness to the promisee rather than respecting the liberty interests of the promisor. See Mautner, supra note 4, at
552–53 (arguing that the shift from subjectivism to objectivism was a
“shift from an ethos of individualism and self-reliance to one of
responsibility, both private and collective, towards others,” and a shift
aimed at promoting “certainty and predictability”).
77.

See Radin, supra note 10, at 1128 (arguing that the advent of
cyberspace contracts will make the conflict between the consent-based
system and nonconsensual practices more urgent).

78.

See Dennis M. Patterson, A Fable from the Seventh Circuit: Frank
Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 503, 522 (1991) (stating
that good faith is “relative to the agreement of the parties”).

79.

Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 Mich.
L. Rev. 1349, 1357–58 (2009).

80.

See discussion infra Part III.D.
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Courts have refused to uphold contracts signed as a result of
duress. 81 These defenses involve situations where one party has
obtained consent improperly. As illustrated by Scenario 8, duress
involves the situation where the promisee used actual physical force or
unlawful threat of death or bodily harm. 82 In this type of situation, it is
easy to conclude that no meaningful consent exists because there is no
free will.
Where one party had misrepresented an existing fact, courts have
also refused to enforce the promise against the consenter who relied on
the misrepresentation. 83 Misrepresentation involves situations where the
promisee obtained the other party’s consent by making a fraudulent
misrepresentation about a material fact, with knowledge of its falsity
and with the intent to induce the other party to enter into the
contract, and where the other party justifiably relied on the
misrepresentation. 84 This defense reflects contract law’s recognition
that there is no free will in such a context. The misrepresentation
deprived the promisor of the information necessary for consent.
Courts have also relied on the doctrine of unconscionability to
refuse enforcement of a contract in certain limited situations. 85
Unconscionability involves situations where one party uses a strong
bargaining position or unethical tactics to take advantage of another’s
weakness, ignorance, or distress. 86 This defense is the broadest and
has the potential to undo many contracts where consent does not
exist. As explained below, however, courts have applied the doctrine
81.

See, e.g., Ortt v. Schwartz, 62 Pa. Super. 70, 74–75 (1916) (stating that
contracts produced under intimidation are voidable, but threats of
arrest before commencement of such proceedings are not enough to constitute duress).

82.

See Brown v. Pierce, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 205, 209–10, 216 (1868) (finding
that contracts or deeds procured through fear of loss of life by the other
party are voidable).

83.

See, e.g., Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906, 908–09 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1968) (finding that representations by a dance studio that the
appellant was a graceful dancer in order to induce her to purchase more
dance lessons to be false and thus a misrepresentation of fact).

84.

For an example of a misrepresentation, see id.

85.

See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding that it is unconscionable when a party with
little bargaining power signs a contract with little or no knowledge of its
contents).

86.

See, e.g., Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ind. 1971)
(refusing to enforce a contract where the stronger party used unequal
bargaining power to its advantage and where the weaker party did not
graduate from high school, did not know the law or understand the
technical terms, and had never read the lease, and where enforcing the
contract would cost the weaker party thousands of dollars for negligence
he did not cause).
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very narrowly. The doctrine in practice has not been used to correct
the more subtle consent problems.
Other contract defenses, such as mistake and incompetence (also
referred to as incapacity or infancy), recognize the fact that the
consenter does not have necessary information because of a fundamental mistake or lacks the mental capacity to consent due to mental
disease or age. The defense of mistake (either mutual or unilateral) can
defeat the formation of a contract where the mistake was about a basic
assumption of contract and the mistake had a material effect on the
agreed-upon exchange of performances. 87 These defenses also rest on the
notion that the parties would not have consented had they known
about the mistake or had the capacity to consent.
Additional recognition of defects with consent is reflected in
doctrines that would excuse the promisor from performance under the
contract. The doctrines of impossibility, impracticability, and frustration recognize the human inability to anticipate all future events that
might affect performance. 88 These doctrines excuse a promisor from
his promise if an event occurs whose nonoccurrence was a basic
assumption upon which consent was based. 89 Contract excuses reflect
judicial recognition of the human inability to see into the future and
courts’ unwillingness to stretch the consent concept too far. 90
C.

Consent and Contract Interpretation

The consent concept also permeates contract interpretation principles. Sometimes, parties dispute the terms of their contract. Courts are
left with the task of determining what the parties have agreed to. In
this area, courts have adopted certain well-established principles as
tools. Those principles reflect contract law’s consent-concentric
87.

See Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 923 (Mich. 1887) (holding that
the defendant seller could rescind the contract of sale if the jury found
that the cow, known as “Rose 2d of Aberlone,” was sold upon the
understanding of both parties that she was barren and useless for
breeding while in fact she was not barren).

88.

See Barrack v. City of Lafayette, 829 P.2d 424, 428–29 (Colo. App. 1991)
(holding that a new regulation by the Colorado Department of Health,
which required all surface water to be treated before delivery, made it
illegal for the City of Lafayette to deliver untreated water, and thus under
the doctrine of impossibility the city was discharged of all contractual
duties that might require it to supply citizens with untreated water).

89.

Id. at 428.

90.

Another contract law defense is based on public policy grounds. Courts
have refused to enforce certain contracts if they are illegal. E.g., Hendrix
v. McKee, 575 P.2d 134, 137 (Or. 1978). This defense is not driven by
the concerns for consent. Instead, the defense reflects a collective social
judgment that those contracts are so offensive that courts will not
enforce them, even if consent exists, because of other overriding public
policy concerns. Id.
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approach. Like contract formation doctrines, defenses, and excuses,
these well-established contract law doctrines tend to favor the written
agreement considered to be the best evidence of the parties’ consent.
For example, one of the rules of contract construction is the wellestablished four corners doctrine. 91 Under the doctrine, a judge is
supposed to stay within the four corners of the contract when
interpreting a written contract to ascertain the intent of the parties. 92
Another related doctrine, the plain meaning rule, requires courts to
interpret a written contract in accordance with its plain meaning if
the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous. 93 Both doctrines
focus on the written language in a contract.
The parol evidence rule is another well-established contract law
principle that bars introduction into evidence of any prior or
contemporaneous written or oral agreement to contradict the explicit
terms of the written contract. 94 To invoke this doctrine, many contracts
typically contain a standard merger or integration clause that expressly
states that the written contract is the final expression of the parties’
intent and that it merges all prior or contemporaneous agreements
between the parties. 95 The parol evidence rule thus favors the written
agreement and reflects contract law’s focus on objective consent.
D.

Current Contract Law’s Enforcement of Contract Under Consent

Application of the above contract law doctrines leads to the
enforcement of all of the contracts falling within Scenario 1. That is
not controversial. However, under current standards, most contracts
in Scenarios 2 through 5 will also be enforced even though the consent
in those cases is problematic. 96
Contract law now generally enforces contracts like the one in Scenario 2 despite the consent defect. 97 In certain extreme cases involving
91.

See, e.g., Midwest Builder Distrib., Inc. v. Lord & Essex, Inc., 891
N.E.2d 1, 19 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (“[W]hen interpreting an integrated
contract, courts are limited to considering material that lies within the
four corners of the text, rather than resorting to extrinsic evidence.”).

92.

Id.

93.

See, e.g., Foothill Capital Corp. v. E. Coast Bldg. Supply Co., 259 B.R.
840, 845 (E.D. Va. 2001) (holding that because both parties conceded that
the language of loan documents was clear and unambiguous, the court’s
inquiry into the parties’ intent was limited to the loan documents).

94.

See, e.g., Williams v. Spitzer Autoworld Canton, L.L.C., 913 N.E.2d 410,
415–16 (Ohio 2009) (holding that the parol evidence rule prohibited
evidence of an oral agreement that contradicted the terms of the written
contract).

95.

See, e.g., id. at 413 (noting that the contract at issue had a merger
clause).

96.

See subprime mortgage cases cited supra note 16.

97.

Id.
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unequal bargaining power and substantive unfairness, courts have
refused to enforce contracts similar to those in Scenarios 3 through 5
by resorting to contract law defenses such as the doctrine of
unconscionability. But courts have been unwilling to expand the
doctrine of unconscionability. 98 As a result, many of the contracts
falling within Scenarios 2 to 5 have been enforced.
As we approach the more problematic end of the consent
spectrum (i.e., contracts falling within Scenarios 6, 7, and 8), courts
have been more willing to invoke current contract law defenses such
as fraud, duress, and undue influence and have struck down those
agreements. 99 As it stands right now, contract law enforces contracts
in multiple situations where consent is defective.

III. Problems with Contract Law’s Consent Focus
Contract law’s focus on consent seemingly offers an objective way
to assess whether a contract should be enforced. But as described in
the above Part, the objective approach to ascertaining the existence
of consent frequently results in enforcing agreements that do not
reflect meaningful consent (for example, agreements falling within
Scenarios 2 through 5). Contract law has not answered many of the
hard questions related to the consent concept in light of
unprecedented marketplace manipulation of information as a result of
better understanding of the human decision-making process.
Contract law should reevaluate its consent-centric approach in light
of the many problems associated with consent. Consent is a motivationally complex concept to begin with. 100 The consent concept is easily
manipulated, and this compounds its inherent complexity. There is
strong evidence of marketplace manipulation targeting human biases. 101
The existence of apparent consent based on objective indicia, such as a
signature on a written document, cannot be presumed to reflect the
individual will where the other party has manipulated information.
The increasing use of standard form contracts and cyberspace
contracts also makes it necessary for contract law to abandon its
98.

See Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 Ala. L. Rev. 73, 101 (2006) (arguing that consumers rarely file
or settle claims in part because of courts’ adverse attitudes toward
unconscionability claims).

99.

See, e.g., Brown v. Pierce, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 205, 209–10 (1868) (finding
threats to life as a form of duress); Weger v. Rocha, 32 P.2d 417, 420
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1934) (finding that the agreement was signed by
the plaintiff under undue influence while she was seriously injured and
in a nervous condition).

100. See discussion infra Part III.A.
101. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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consent focus. 102 In those situations, there is an increasing disconnect
between consent in contract law and consent in reality. 103 Contract
law’s traditional search for consent is inappropriate in those
situations. Maintaining the consent focus will put contract law in the
untenable position of having to maintain a fiction when it is not
possible to find meaningful consent.
Current contract law defenses are insufficient to overcome the bias of
a consent-focused approach. As long as contract law remains consent
centric and contract law doctrines remain oriented toward the search for
consent, it does not solve the fundamental problems of power imbalance
and contract law’s potential to perpetuate that imbalance.104
A.

The Motivational Complexity of Consent

Consent is an intentional behavior, and it is an act of meaning
that necessarily derives its meaning from the sociocultural context in
which it is recognized. 105 Concepts such as choice or consent can mean
different things to different people depending on their cultural
background and social class. 106
For example, Professor West described the characters in the
fictional world of Franz Kafka and contrasted that world against the
ideal one envisioned by law and economics scholar Richard Posner.
She pointed out that in both worlds, consent was used to “validat[e]
otherwise unappealing states of affairs.” 107 She described consent as an
“ambiguously motivated human act” and cautioned against relying on
consent as a basis for moral justification. 108
Consent is also a culturally dependent concept. Studies have
shown that middle-class Americans tend to value choice more so than
people from working-class or other cultural backgrounds. 109 The significance of these findings is that people may be motivated by
multiple factors when they “consent.”
102. See discussion infra Part III.C.
103. Radin, supra note 10, at 1128.
104. Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Formation and the Entrenchment of Power,
41 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 175, 198–99 (2009).
105. Jerome Bruner, Acts of Meaning 28–29 (1990).
106. Nicole M. Stephens, Hazel Rose Markus & Sarah S.M. Townsend,
Choice as an Act of Meaning: The Case of Social Class, 93 J.
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 814 (2007); see also West, supra note
7, at 386–88 (comparing consent in Posner’s world of welfare maximizing
individuals with Kafka’s world of authoritarian personalities).
107. West, supra note 7, at 386.
108. Id. at 425.
109. See Stephens, Markus & Townsend, supra note 106, at 815 (“[I]ndependence is the dominant discourse in mainstream American society . . . .”).
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The country we live in today is very different from the country
during the nineteenth century when contract law experienced its
growth. 110 According to 2010 census data, the landscape of the U.S.
population is rapidly changing. Although whites remain the
majority, 111 there were substantial increases in minority populations
between 2000 and 2010. 112 For example, the Hispanic and Asian
groups each increased by 43 percent. 113
Contract law’s consent focus, viewed from the colored lens of
dominant western values, will often result in enforcing an agreement
where there is no consent. The result will be use of state power in
favor of those with more resources. 114
B.

Marketplace Manipulation of Consent

Consent’s complexity poses even more challenges when
marketplace actors devote substantial resources to manipulate
people’s consent. Behavioral studies in the last three decades have
demonstrated that the human decision-making process can be easily
manipulated. 115 Human beings suffer from predictable biases. 116 We
110. See Mautner, supra note 4, at 552–53 (discussing the shift from
subjectivism to objectivism in contract law during the nineteenth
century).
111. According to the 2010 census, “White” refers to a person having origins
in any of the original peoples of Europe, the Middle East, or North
Africa. Karen R. Humes, Nicholas A. Jones & Roberto R.
Ramirez, Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010 Census
Briefs 3 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/
briefs/c2010br-02.pdf. It includes people who indicated their race as
“White” or reported entries such as Irish, German, Italian, Lebanese,
Arab, Moroccan, or Caucasian. Id. So “White” is not as monocultural as
the label suggests.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 3, 5.
114. One of the impetuses for the Occupy Wall Street Movement is economic
inequality. Occupy Wall Street, supra note 25.
115. See, e.g., Ariely, supra note 37, at 317 (“But, as the results presented
in this book (and others) show, . . . [o]ur irrational behaviors are neither
random nor senseless—they are systematic and predictable.”);
Kahneman, supra note 13, at 8–10 (explaining that “heuristics and
biases” are becoming increasingly studied in fields outside psychology).
One could argue that human manipulation of information and of each
other has been present since the beginning of time. The oldest example of
that is when Eve persuaded Adam to eat the fruit from the Forbidden
Tree. That is why businesses spend money on advertising. Although
manipulation has always been present, manipulation at such sophisticated
levels and on such a scale has only been present for the last couple of
decades. Difficult as it is, contract law needs to draw a line between what
is acceptable and what is not. The reasonableness standard proposed in
this Article allows a court to draw the line appropriately. Contract law’s
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tend to be overly optimistic and myopic, and we place too little
weight on future costs and benefits and too much weight on shortterm costs and benefits. 117 Individuals also tend to misjudge the likelihood of a future event. They rely on the shortcut of a small sample of
present events as indicative of future events while ignoring other
evidence, such as prior occurrences and the quality of the sample. 118
These biases lead to systematic underestimation of future risks. 119
The human tendency to rely on shortcuts to make decisions often
leads to predictable mistakes. 120 For example, when making a decision,
we tend to rely on information that is salient or available to us
(referred to as the saliency effect). 121 These known biases make it
possible to predict people’s irrationality. 122 Studies have shown that
what people choose tends to be influenced by how the choices are
presented to them (referred to as the framing effect). 123
Manipulating those biases was exactly what happened in
transactions leading up to the subprime mortgage crisis. 124 In those
transactions, lenders manipulated borrowers with less information
through deliberate contract design. 125 Subprime loan products with
cost deferral features took advantage of people’s inherent biases. The
borrowers focused on short-term benefits and underestimated future
risks. 126 Those mortgage products were also deliberately designed to
be so complicated that borrowers could not properly assess the
risks. 127
tolerance of unbridled marketplace manipulation will end up using the
coercive power of the state to aid the manipulator.
116. Ariely, supra note 37, at 317.
117. See id. at 320 (“It is difficult to sacrifice consumption today for saving
in the distant future, but it is psychologically easier to sacrifice
consumption in the future . . . .”).
118. Kahneman, supra note 13, at 8–10.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Ariely, supra note 37, at 317.
123. Kahneman, supra note 13, at 88.
124. Bar-Gill, supra note 14, at 1120–21; White, supra note 14, at 158–59.
125. Bar-Gill, supra note 14, at 1079–80; White, supra note 14, at 158–60.
126. See David Faber, And Then the Roof Caved In 45 (2009) (discussing how after a twenty-minute phone call, borrowers could have a loan
cleared within a week). For a detailed discussion of how lenders
exploited these decisional biases in consumer contract contexts, see
White, supra note 14, at 158–60, and the articles cited therein.
127. See Edmund L. Andrews, Busted: Life Inside the Great Mortgage Meltdown 77 (2009) (pointing out that even former Federal
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C.

The Growing Disconnect Between Consent and
Commercial Contract Practices

Commercial contract practices, such as the increasingly common
use of form contracts and cyberspace contracts, also make it more
urgent to reexamine the consent-focused approach. 128 The exponential
increase in cyberspace commercial transactions means that more and
more contracts are being entered into electronically. In cyberspace
transactions a user is typically required to agree by clicking on the
“OK” button. 129 In those cases, users often do not see the terms before
the transaction, 130 or they have not read the terms before they click
on the button indicating acceptance of those terms. In those cases, it
is difficult to imagine that informed consent exists. 131
As Professor Radin pointed out, the advent of cyberspace
contracting exposes the consent problem. She pointed out that “[t]he
problem, in a nutshell, is that our ordinary-discourse commitment to
a consent-based system will come into clearer conflict with practices
that do not seem consensual.” 132
It is clear that cyberspace contracting is here to stay. 133 Contract
law’s consent centric-approach presents a court with this dilemma: If
the court is true to the consent concept, it will have to strike down
cyberspace contracts for lack of consent. One cannot seriously argue
that a buyer has consented at the time of contracting when the buyer
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan acknowledged “that a person with a
PhD in mathematics wouldn’t understand them”).
128. Radin, supra note 10, at 1128.
129. See id. at 1128–30 (describing various “contract as click” agreements).
130. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996)
(finding that the defendant’s use of the software after purchase, coupled
with a license agreement that appeared on screen, constituted
acceptance). The ProCD case presented an extreme example of the
disconnect between contract law and marketplace practices. Judge
Easterbrook held that a “contract” was enforceable even though the
buyer did not know about the contract when he purchased the product.
Id. This raises the interesting issue of whether consent is a necessary
element of a contract, which is beyond the scope of this Article.
131. I have to confess that I have personally clicked on an “accept” button
on many occasions. A few times, I did make a valiant effort to read and
understand the contract terms, but gave up when it became too time
consuming and I needed to use the software. On those occasions, I
hoped silently that the terms I had just accepted were reasonable terms.
132. Radin, supra note 10, at 1128.
133. See, e.g., ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451 (pointing out that these types of
business practices, “[n]otice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a
right to return the software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable (a
right that the license expressly extends), may be a means of doing
business valuable to buyers and sellers alike”).
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has never read the contract. That would mean that a large number of
cyberspace contracts would not be upheld regardless of the practical
necessity of having to rely on those contracts to move cyberspace
commerce forward. On the other hand, if a court chooses to uphold
such a contract, it will necessarily appear to be paying lip service to the
consent concept. 134 By finding consent where there is none, the court is
not only damaging its own credibility and the legitimacy of contract
law as an institution, but also denigrating the ideals imbued in the
concept.
D.

Insufficiency of Current Contract Defenses

Can current contract law defenses address the defects related to
consent? Yes, but only to a certain extent. In the scenarios set forth
in Part I.B, courts have applied contract law defenses to strike down
agreements falling within Scenarios 6, 7, and 8. But so long as the
analysis begins with a search for consent, courts are unlikely to apply
these contract law defenses to contracts with consent defects
identified in Scenarios 2 through 5. A different mindset and standard
are necessary to address those consent problems.
Judges, like other humans, suffer from decisional biases. For a
judge with a traditional commitment to the consent focus, contract
law defenses will not be sufficient to address the more subtle consent
problems identified in Scenarios 2 through 5. That explains why
courts have mostly enforced contracts similar to those in Scenarios 2
through 5. 135 Behavioral studies have shown that humans are easily
influenced by what they are exposed to, a phenomenon known as the
priming effect, 136 the anchoring effect, 137 and availability bias. 138 Since
courts are primed to think that consent is sufficient to justify
enforcement of contracts, they have proven very reluctant to rely on
134. Judge Easterbrook faced this dilemma in ProCD and he apparently
chose the more practical approach. As a result, he was widely criticized.
See, e.g., Roger C. Bern, “Terms Later” Contracting: Bad Economics,
Bad Morals, and a Bad Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook
Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. & Pol’y 641, 641–43 (2004) (providing
multiple articles that disagree with Judge Easterbrook’s opinion). For
other examples of courts paying lip service to consent, see cases cited
supra notes 70–72.
135. See discussion supra Part I.B. and cases cited therein.
136. See Kahneman, supra note 13, at 52–53 (demonstrating that the
priming effect will lead people to complete “SO_ P” with “SOUP”
instead of “SOAP” after having recently seen or heard “EAT”).
137. See id. at 122–24 (discussing various studies showing how people
readjust their guesses after hearing another possible answer).
138. See id. at 129–35 (describing various studies showing that if people can
come up with many instances of a particular class, they will judge that
category to be large).
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any contract law defenses to undo a contract where apparent consent
seems to exist.
For example, courts have been extremely reluctant to apply the
doctrine of unconscionability. 139 Conceived in equity, this doctrine
could have been used to undo contracts where consent was problematic. An expansive application of the doctrine of unconscionability
could, for example, result in voiding those agreements in Scenarios 2
through 5. But courts have not done so. 140 Courts have applied the
doctrine only in limited situations involving unequal bargaining power
and unfair terms. 141 The cases where courts have applied the doctrine
typically involve a consumer who signed a standard form contract—
drafted by the more powerful party and with draconian terms
favoring the powerful party. 142 It is very rare to have a successful
unconscionability defense in a commercial context. 143 Courts have only
found an agreement unconscionable where it offended notions of
“decency,” or had grossly unfair results—all viewed in the context of
a firm commitment to the consent concept. 144

139. See generally Schmitz, supra note 98 (discussing in depth the
development of the unconscionability doctrine).
140. See cases arising out of subprime mortgage crisis, supra note 16.
141. See generally Paul Bennett Marrow, Squeezing Subjectivity from the
Doctrine of Unconscionability, 53 Clev. St. L. Rev. 187 (2005–06)
(arguing to update, or even eliminate, current unconscionability doctrine
and govern potentially unconscionable contracts by various legislative
regimes).
142. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449–
50 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (“[W]hen a party of little bargaining power, and
hence little real choice, signs a commercially unreasonably contract with
little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his
consent . . . was ever given to all the terms. In such a case . . .
enforcement should be withheld.”).
143. See Schmitz, supra note 98, at 101 (describing legislative attempts to
limit unconscionable contracts by permitting merchants to elect states
that enforce form contracts).
144. See Nancy S. Kim, Evolving Business and Social Norms and
Interpretation Rules: The Need for a Dynamic Approach to Contract
Disputes, 84 Neb. L. Rev. 506, 551–52 (2005) (“Generally, an
unconscionable agreement offends notions of ‘decency’ . . . .” (quoting
Gimbel Bros. Inc. v. Swift, 307 N.Y.S.2d 952, 954 (Civ. Ct. 1970)));
Mautner, supra note 4, at 554 (“[T]he culture that judges and lawyers
internalize in their daily lives determines, in subtle but effective ways,
the options available to them in making decisions in the law and in
developing the law. This explanation does not negate the role of
reflective, conscious legal deliberation in law. Still, it is premised on the
claim that to act in law is to act within a cultural system, so that a
good deal of what transpires in law is done on the non-reflective and
non-conscious level.”).
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E.

Consent and Contract Law Goals

Contract law’s consent focus may be detrimental to stated
contract law goals. Scholars have identified various goals of contract
law, including constraining opportunistic behavior, reducing transaction costs, and promoting efficient exchanges. 145 Contract law’s
consent focus actually encourages opportunistic behavior. For
example, lenders targeting borrowers relied on consent to justify
inducing borrowers to sign up for subprime mortgage products that
they could not afford. 146 Investment bankers relied on consent to
justify their sale of risky derivative financial products to third-party
investors. 147 As long as the parties know that their contracts will be
enforced if they can manage to get the other party to sign the
contract, the parties are motivated to manipulate the information to
obtain consent. 148
Contract law’s consent approach will result in increased
transaction costs. The consent focus will lead to enforcing more and
more contracts that are not the result of voluntary consent.
Eventually, this will result in less trust in society. 149 When trust is
low, the transactional costs ex ante are high because people have to
provide for multiple contingencies not encountered when people trust
each other. 150 The transaction costs ex post are also high when
unhappy contractual parties sue each other, as evidenced by the
aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis. 151
145. Trebilcock, supra note 7, at 16–17.
146. For example, lenders were reportedly blaming borrowers for choosing
their real estate investments or loans with subprime terms. Rick Brooks
& Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Worthy,
Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 2007, at A1.
147. A Wall Street firm was quoted as saying that professional investors
chose the risk exposure and voluntarily bought derivative financial
products. Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Banks Bundled Bad
Debt, Bet Against It and Won, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 2009, at A1.
148. See discussions supra Part II.
149. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Freefall: America, Free Markets, and
the Sinking of the World Economy 289 (2010) (“[W]e have created
an economic system that encourages shortsighted behavior—behavior
that is so shortsighted that the costs of the breakdown in trust are never
taken into account.”).
150. See Shermer, supra note 40, at 177–78 (quoting Paul Zak, a professor
of economics at Claremont Graduate University, explaining the positive
correlation between trust and economic growth).
151. Navigant Consulting, Inc., a global consulting firm, found that more
subprime-related lawsuits were filed in the first half of 2008 than in all of
2007 and that the total number of subprime-related lawsuits exceeded the
number of lawsuits resulting from the savings and loan crisis in the early
1990s. Subprime Mortgage Litigation Filings Surpass S&L Benchmark,
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The consent focus may also undermine the efficiency goal of
contract law. Contract law’s private ordering paradigm is said to
promote efficiency because it is presumed that parties would not have
entered into a contract unless they felt that the transaction would
have made them better off. 152 Hence, when contract law limits itself to
enforcing the bargain struck by the parties, it is said to be promoting
efficient exchanges. But that presumption is only valid if the parties
enter into the transaction voluntarily and with all the information
necessary to make a decision. 153 Because of the problems identified in
this Article, the focus on consent will lead to enforcing contracts
without informed decision making. For example, a large number of
subprime mortgage transactions left millions of people worse off than
before. Many borrowers might not have entered into these
transactions had they had access to all the information necessary to
make an informed decision.
Ultimately, contract law’s consent-centric approach is unfair to
people who are not in a good position to help themselves. A legitimate
governmental goal is to create a society fair for its people. Fairness is
also embodied in multiple constitutional principles such as the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Contract law’s
consent approach, seemingly neutral on its face, is unfair to people
who are not as well informed or endowed with resources. 154

IV. Alternative to a Consent-Focused Approach
If contract law does not rely on an individual’s consent as a
lynchpin of enforcement, what test should contract law adopt to
determine whether to enforce a contract? This Article suggests that
courts adopt a totality of circumstances test to determine whether a
contract should be enforced. A totality of circumstances test would be
more flexible than a consent-focused approach. Instead of trying to
ascertain whether an individual consented or not—an almost
Navigant Consulting Study Finds, Navigant, 1 (Sept. 10, 2008),
http://www.navigant.com/~/media/Site/Insights/Financial%20Services/
Subprime%20Mortgage%20Litigation%20F_Financial%20Services.ashx.
Navigant reported that 607 lawsuits were filed in the federal court during
the 18 months ending in June 2008. Id. This number is higher than the
number of lawsuits filed in any other major financial crisis. Id.
152. Trebilcock, supra note 7, at 244 (“The strongest welfare claim that
can be made on behalf of the private ordering paradigm is from the
perspective of Pareto efficiency. . . . [I]f two parties are to be observed
entering into a contract, one should normally presume that they would
not have done so unless they felt that the contract was likely to make
them better off.”).
153. Id.
154. Dalton, supra note 6, at 1012–21.

85

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 1·2012
The Unbearable Lightness of Consent in Contract Law

impossible task due to the complexities of reality—a court should
examine multiple factors surrounding the entire transaction before it
enforces a contract. Courts will not have any difficulties applying the
test. They have applied such a test in multiple contexts. 155 The test
allows courts to utilize their greatest strength—their fact-finding
expertise. 156
A.

The Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test in Other Contexts

The totality of circumstances test is no stranger to courts. Courts
have applied the test in multiple contexts, especially in situations that
implicate consent. The test reflects the courts’ recognition of the
perils of relying on outward manifestations of consent. Courts in the
criminal law context have refused to take the apparent consent of the
accused at face value. 157
For example, courts have adopted a totality of circumstances test
to decide whether confessions by an accused in a criminal law context
are voluntary. In criminal law, courts endorse “the strongly felt attitude
of our society that important human values are sacrificed where an
agency of the government, in the course of securing a conviction, wrings
a confession out of an accused against his will.” 158 To determine
whether the confession is voluntary, courts apply a totality of the
155. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
156. See United States v. Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311, 316 (8th Cir.
1982) (“[A] court must utilize its fact-finding expertise and judge each
case on its own facts after considering all the circumstances of the case.”).
One ready criticism against the adoption of this test is: How can we be
sure that the courts will get it right? As some scholars have pointed out,
individual autonomy may be threatened if courts are not good at what
they are doing. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Remedies When Contracts
Lack Consent: Autonomy and Institutional Competence, 33 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 209, 233 (1995) (suggesting that if courts do not get it right,
“the state is not merely failing to prevent infringements of autonomy but
is actively contributing to those infringements”). The totality of
circumstances test also encourages more court intervention into private
contractual relationships and conjures up images of “big brother.” The
essential question remains: Are we more willing to subject ourselves to
unbridled marketplace greed or to the government? When the marketplace fails to function in a fair and equitable manner, we have no choice
but resort to government assistance, imperfect as the solution is.
157. With limited exceptions, courts in criminal cases are generally
untroubled by the same problems that plague consent in contract law.
Yet in both situations, consent is heavily influenced by the circumstances surrounding the event. The difference is perhaps caused by the
fact that in criminal law an individual’s physical liberty and other state
interests are at stake, while in contract law only economic interests are
at stake. But is there any reason to treat commercial interests as less
worthy of protection? This question is reserved for another day.
158. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206–07 (1960).
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circumstances test and examine the circumstances of the interrogation,
instead of focusing on the existence of consent by the accused. 159
Courts also apply a totality of circumstances test in evaluating
whether a juvenile has waived his or her Miranda rights. 160 In that
context, courts put “a heavy burden . . . on the government to
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or
appointed counsel.” 161 The Supreme Court noted that the question of
whether an accused waived his rights “is not one of form, but rather
whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the
rights delineated in the Miranda case.” 162 The Court then pointed out
that the determination whether statements obtained during custodial
interrogation are admissible against the accused is to be made upon
an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation. 163 In the criminal law context, the “totality of the
circumstances” test permits a court to look into multiple factors such
as the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and
intelligence and into whether he has the capacity to understand the
warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and
the consequences of waiving those rights. 164
In another context involving definitional difficulties, courts have also
applied a totality of circumstances test in evaluating whether a debtor
satisfied the good faith requirement under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3)’s
Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.165 Recognizing the inherent difficulty in
defining “good faith,” one court promulgated a test in which a
bankruptcy court could utilize its fact-finding expertise and reach a
decision after considering all the circumstances of a case. 166 In considering whether a Chapter 13 debtor proposed his plan in good faith, courts
examine factors such as the type of debt sought to be discharged,
159. Id. at 207–08.
160. See generally Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (finding that a
juvenile respondent waived his Fifth Amendment rights, notwithstanding his request to see his probation officer); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that the government needs to notify arrested
individuals of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights prior to an
interrogation).
161. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
162. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979).
163. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475–77.
164. Id. at 468–69.
165. Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 898 F.2d 1346, 1348–49 (8th Cir.
1990).
166. United States v. Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311, 316–17 (8th Cir.
1982).
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whether the debt is nondischargeable under Chapter 7, and the debtor’s
motivation and sincerity in seeking Chapter 13 relief. 167 Other courts
have adopted a totality of circumstances test similar to that used by
the 8th Circuit in LeMaire and Estus to determine whether the
Chapter 13 debtor has proposed a plan in good faith. 168
Courts have also used a totality of circumstances test in
ascertaining the existence of probable cause necessary for the issuance
of a search warrant, 169 in determining foreseeability in employerliability cases, 170 in establishing vicarious liability under the
Commodities Exchange Act, 171 and in determining the validity of
patents. 172 Some courts have adopted a totality of circumstances test
to determine whether prison conditions violate the Eighth Amend-

167. LeMaire, 898 F.2d at 1349.
168. See, e.g., Hardin v. Caldwell (In re Caldwell), 851 F.2d 852, 859 (6th
Cir. 1988) (concluding that “the list provided in In re Estus [was] a
particularly succinct and clear statement of some of the factors that a
court may find meaningful in making its determination of good faith”
(internal quotation omitted)); Neufeld v. Freeman, 794 F.2d 149, 152
(4th Cir. 1986) (holding that a totality of circumstances test may also
include consideration of debtor’s pre-petition conduct); Pub. Fin. Corp.
v. Freeman, 712 F.2d 219, 221 (5th Cir. 1983) (upholding the
bankruptcy court’s finding that a plan proposing no payments to
unsecured creditors was proposed in good faith); Flygare v. Boulden,
709 F.2d 1344, 1347 (10th Cir. 1983) (adopting the factors set forth in
Estus); Kitchens v. Ga. R.R. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Kitchens), 702
F.2d 885, 888–89 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that determination of good
faith required consideration of factors similar to those used in Estus);
Goeb v. Heid (In re Goeb), 675 F.2d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding
that good faith analysis involving consideration of various factors may
also include the substantiality of the proposed repayment); Ravenot v.
Rimgale (In re Rimgale), 669 F.2d 426, 431–32 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding
that a fixed 70 percent repayment requirement was unnecessary to
establish good faith).
169. See, e.g., State v. Baldoni, 609 A.2d 219 (R.I. 1992) (per curiam)
(involving a Rhode Island state police officer’s effort to obtain a warrant
that would authorize a search of the defendant’s residence).
170. See, e.g., Isaacs v. Huntington Mem’l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985)
(establishing the totality of the circumstances as the proper test for
foreseeability regarding employer liability).
171. See, e.g., Stotler & Co. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 855
F.2d 1288, 1292 (7th Cir. 1988) (establishing the totality of the
circumstances as the proper test in determining vicarious liability for
“soliciting customers to trade commodity futures accounts”).
172. See, e.g., Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng’g, Inc., 904 F.2d 1571, 1574
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (internal quotation omitted) (“Whether an invention is
on sale is a question of law, and no single finding or conclusion is a sine
qua non to its resolution. The totality of the circumstances must always
be considered . . . .”).
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ment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 173
This survey of the cases involving totality-of-the-circumstances
tests shows that courts have fashioned a more flexible test to
ascertain the existence of consent to protect important interests. Why
should economic interests be treated differently? Some scholars have
argued that economic rights should be treated as human rights. 174 The
ultimate, overarching goal of contract law should be fairness in
economic exchanges. A totality of the circumstances approach would
be much more suited for this goal than focusing on the elusive search
for consent of the parties.
B.

The Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test for Contract Enforcement

How does a totality-of-the-circumstances test work in contract
law? 175 Instead of searching for an individual’s consent, the test will
permit the courts to examine multiple factors to determine whether a
contract should be enforced. As part of the inquiry, consent will
become a factor of the analysis, not the factor in justifying use of
state power.
For example, under this test, a court can ask whether a
reasonable person under the circumstances would have understood the
terms of the contract and consented based on a full understanding of
the terms. The court can also look into the circumstances surrounding
the negotiations. Was the promisor able to negotiate the terms of the
agreement? The court can also look at the resources of the parties.
Did one party have substantially more resources than the other
party? Was there any manipulation of the information that would
render it unfair for the court to enforce the contract? What are the
terms? Are the terms commercially reasonable? Any other practical
concerns that would render enforcement appropriate?
A totality-of-circumstances-test is a more honest standard. 176 It relieves contract law and courts from the untenable position of having to
173. See, e.g., Jackson v. Hendrick, 503 A.2d 400 (Pa. 1986) (remanding the
case because the lower court did not assess whether the overcrowding of
the prison population violated the Eight Amendment based on a
totality-of-the-circumstances test).
174. See Robin West, Reconstructing Liberty, 59 Tenn. L. Rev. 441, 466
(1992) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment must be understood as including
the[ ] positive rights of autonomy, economic self-sufficiency, and political
self-governance.” (emphasis added)).
175. Professor Craswell has suggested that a discussion of what counts as
knowing or voluntary consent should take into consideration the
institutional competence of the courts to award an appropriate remedy
if a contract lacks any meaningful consent. Craswell, supra note 156, at
210, 213. It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine the
relationship between institutional competence and consent analysis.
176. When arguing that consent cannot justify all human experiments,
Garnett described the reliance on consent as “subterfuge designed to
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ascertain the existence of a human act as elusive as consent and, when
inevitably failing to do so, of having to maintain a fiction. Continuing
the fiction will put the legitimacy of contract law into doubt. 177

Conclusion
The consent concept may have played a useful role when
economic relationships were simpler and when there was less
manipulation in the marketplace. 178 But with unprecedented
manipulation of human decision-making biases, as identified by
behavioral economists in the last few decades, consent has become
very elusive and difficult to define and ascertain. Because of those
difficulties, consent should no longer serve as a justification for the
government’s exercise of power in favor of one party over the other in
a contractual relationship. Contract law has so far relied on a
patchwork of defenses and doctrines to deal with the defects of
consent, but these efforts do not address the difficult situations caused
by increasingly sophisticated marketplace manipulations and practices. If contract law continues its consent focus, it will end up siding
with the more powerful parties in an economic relationship. One of
government’s functions is to reduce the scope of exploitation. 179
Contract law’s focus on consent will produce a result in opposition to
government’s goals. It will further the perception that government is
putting its thumb on the scale for the rich and the powerful.

hide our unease and to allow us to profess simultaneous commitment to
values that often conflict.” Garnett, supra note 32, at 460.
177. One can argue that another way to solve the consent problem is to
adopt the informed-consent concept. The problem is that the inquiry
into informed consent gets us mired in some tough factual inquiries. For
example, when has a person truly consented? Do we go by objective
manifestations or subjective understanding? What if someone truly
believes that he consented and acted consistently with the subjective
consent (think subprime borrowers); does that justify the state’s
enforcement of consent? What about people who voluntarily agree to be
slaves? What about people who do not understand the terms of the
contract? Some scholars suspect that informed consent is often honored
in the breach and difficult to enforce as a practical matter. Schuck,
supra note 1, at 932–33 (discussing the informed consent requirement in
the patient-physician context).
178. See Stiglitz, supra note 149, at 205 (“The appropriate role of the state
differs from country to country and from era to era. Twenty-firstcentury capitalism is different from nineteenth century capitalism. . . .
Globalization and new technologies have opened up the possibility of
new global monopolies with a wealth and power beyond anything that
the barons of the late nineteenth century could have dreamed.”).
179. Id. at 204.
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